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Abstract
It is commonly agreed that the term spread and stock returns are useful in
predicting recessions. We extend these empirical findings by examining interest
rate and stock market volatility as additional recession indicators. Both risk-return
analysis and the theory of investment under uncertainty provide a rationale for this
extension. The results for the United States, Germany and Japan show that interest
rate and stock return volatility contribute significantly to the forecasting of future
recessions. This holds in particular for short term predictions.
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Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
On yleisesti tunnettua, että tietoja osaketuotoista ja lyhyiden ja pitkien korkojen
erotuksesta voidaan käyttää hyväksi taloustaantumien ennakoinnissa. Tässä tutki-
muksessa laajennamme tätä koskevia empiirisiä tuloksia tarkastelemalla korkojen
ja osakemarkkinoiden volatiiliutta taantuman indikaattorina. Sekä riski-tuottotar-
kastelu että teoriat epävarmuuden vaikutuksesta investointeihin tukevat tätä laa-
jennusta. Yhdysvaltojen, Saksan ja Japanin taloutta koskevat tulokset osoittavat,
että korkojen ja osakekurssien volatiilius auttaa merkitsevästi ennustamaan tulevia
taantumia. Tämä pätee erityisesti lyhyen aikavälin ennustamisessa.
Asiasanat: suhdannevaihtelut, osakemarkkinoiden volatiilius, korkojen volatiilius,
probit-malli











Accurate forecasts of business cycles are extremely important for many economic
decisionmakers. Policymakers need forecasts for proposing national budgets or
when implementing monetary policy. Entrepreneurs often rely on such forecasts
in order to schedule optimal production plans. In this respect, financial market
information has proven its usefulness to enrich the information set of
macroeconomic forecasters. Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998) point out that
stock prices are useful predictors, particularly one to three quarters ahead. Beyond
one quarter, the term spread becomes the best single predictor of recessions. This
result not only holds for the US but also for most other industrialised countries.
1
Although financial markets have gained the interest of macroeconomists
searching for good leading indicators, remarkably little attention is given to
volatility measures.
2 Still, it is well know that volatility increases after stock
prices fall. It increases during recessions and also around major financial crises
(Schwert, 1989). Also Hamilton and Lin (1996) suggest that volatility in the stock
market may prove useful in forecasting the future trend in real economic activity.
In macroeconomic applications, there may be important relationships between
financial market volatility and real aggregates. Firstly, many studies document a
wealth effect on consumption (see, e.g., Poterba and Samwick, 1995, Starr-
McCluer, 1998, Otto, 1999). Hence, more uncertain financial wealth is likely to
depress current consumption, which in turn will lead to a decline of economic
growth. Secondly, several channels may transmit financial market volatility into
corporate investment and hence (directly or indirectly) into real activity. The
theory of irreversible investments argues that increased volatility gives rise to
postponing investment decisions (see, e.g. Bernanke, 1983, and Dixit, 1992). Also
the traditional investment theory relates the cost of capital to financial market
volatility. If markets are turbulent and prices deviate from their fundamentals, a
higher risk premium will be required and this, in turn, will depress investment
(Hu, 1995). Finally, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) provide empirical evidence
showing that the corporate need for external financing depends on market
volatility: in periods of high market volatility, common stock issues are scarcer
than in tranquil periods.
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extra information value
of financial volatility for business cycle forecasting in the US, Germany and
Japan. We are aware of only a few studies that address this issue. Pindyck and
Solimano (1993) find that volatility (of the marginal productivity of capital)
reduces the rate of investment for a panel of LDC countries but not for a panel of
OECD countries (decade average observations of 1960s, 1970, 1980s). Anderson
and Breedon (1996) for the UK do not find any evidence that measures of asset
price volatility (stocks, T-bills, bonds, exchange rate) have any consequences for
                                                
1 See Harvey (1988), Hardouvelis (1988), Boulier and Stekler (2000), Campbell et al. (2001) for
more US evidence; Harvey (1991) and Funke (1997) for Germany; Davis and Henry (1994) for
Germany and UK; Hu (1993) for the G-7; Bernard and Gerlach (1996) and Bonser-Neal and
Morley (1997) for many industrial countries; Estrella and Mishkin (1997) for the big-4 of the EU;
Davis and Fagan (1997) for the EU countries.
2 In finance theory, the behavior of market volatility crucially influences intertemporal
decisionmaking under uncertainty. Furthermore, when modeling the term structure of interest
rates, three factors are needed: the short rate, the long rate (or the spread) and the volatility of the
short rate, see, e.g., Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Gong and Remolona (1997).8
investment or consumption; their data are quarterly, 1977–1995. Campbell et al.
(2001) find that lagged volatility measures (disaggregate – firm, industry and
market volatility) help to predict quarterly US GDP growth over 1962–1997. Our
results confirm that both interest rate and stock market volatility add significant
explanatory power, both in probit and OLS estimations, to predict future
recessions or real growth. However, there appear to be regime shifts, differences
between the information content of stock market and interest rate volatility and
country differences (Japan versus the US and Germany). The paper proceeds as
follows. In the next section the data are described and descriptive statistics are
discussed. In a further section the empirical evidence is presented. The final
section concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
In this study, monthly data are used since most information from financial prices
comes at high frequency and tends to become less useful vis-à-vis macroeconomic
aggregates when measured over lower frequencies. It complements Boulier and
Stekler (2000) who evaluate the findings of Estrella and Mishkin (1998) over a
monthly interval. Long term interest rates refer to 10-year government bond
yields, short term interest rates are 3-month euro interest rates (money market call
rate for Japan). The yield spread measures the difference between these rates. Real
stock returns were constructed from logarithmic changes of the (nominal) stock
indices (S&P500 for the US, DAX for Germany and Nikkei-225 for Japan),
corrected for inflation.
3 Financial series were taken from BIS. Inflation was
measured by the logarithmic change of the CPI-index taken from IFS (series 64).
Dates separating contractions and expansions are those reported by NBER for the
US, Economic Planning Agency for Japan, and Centre for International Business
Cycle Research for Germany.
4
In order to measure volatility, several candidates come to mind. The most
forward looking volatility estimate is the implied volatility from options.
Unfortunately, options on stock indices and interest rates only became listed in the
1980s (US) or the 1990s (Germany, Japan). Consequently, we would be left with
a too short time period in order to do forecasting. Another natural candidate is a
GARCH-type model. GARCH, however, implies that volatilities behave in a
deterministic way and can only have upward shocks. Moreover, Lamoureux and
Lastrapes (1993) and Jorion (1995) both have shown that implied volatilities or
even simple historical forecasts outperform GARCH-based volatility forecasts.
Taking these facts into account, volatility estimates of stocks and bonds were
constructed as mean absolute deviations, over a one month interval, of daily
changes in 3-month euro interest rates
5 and daily logarithmic stock price changes.
The mean absolute deviation is taken as a risk measure since for small sample
                                                
3 The rationale is that economic activity is better measured by real rather than nominal magnitudes.
Therefore, also stock prices are adjusted for the level of inflation.
4 The average duration of a recession was 11 months in the US, 30 months in Germany and 22
months in Japan for the given sample periods.
5 The US VOLR is also calculated for the 10-year constant maturity interest rate series, since this
series is also available on a daily basis (source: Fed St. Louis). The results do not differ much,
though.9
sizes (as is the case here: one month of data, about 20 observations), it is superior
to the otherwhise optimal standard deviation.
6 Compare with Campbell et al.
(2001) who also use daily data to construct sample variances for that month.
Table 1. +,-./,,-,
SP SR VOLR VOLS SP SR VOLR VOLS SP SR VOLR VOLS
8QLWHG￿6WDWHV
1963:7–2000:12 1963:7–1981:12 1982:1–2000:12
Mean 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.60 –0.88 –0.25 0.10 0.53 1.12 0.77 0.05 0.67
Maximum 3.49 10.82 0.66 3.76 2.37 9.12 0.66 1.68 3.49 10.82 0.34 3.76
Minimum –6.69 –13.49 0.00 0.17 –6.69 –12.48 0.00 0.17 –1.30 –13.49 8⋅ 10
–6 0.25
Std. Dev. 1.86 3.47 0.08 0.30 1.89 3.53 0.09 0.25 1.17 3.35 0.05 0.33
Unit root ADF –3.26 –8.20 –2.98 –5.03 –3.08 –5.60 –2.09 –2.98 –1.63 –6.48 –3.93 –4.21
Unit root PP –3.57 –15.86 –6.18 –10.45 –3.38 –11.71 –4.96 –5.77 –1.88 –10.89 –4.89 –8.56























Mean 1.56 0.34 0.12 0.73 2.47 –0.31 0.22 0.62 0.91 0.81 0.04 0.81
Maximum 8.80 13.16 1.62 3.00 8.80 13.16 1.62 1.40 2.99 10.59 0.42 3.00
Minimum –2.79 –26.79 0.00 0.22 –2.79 –12.52 0.03 0.26 –2.36 –26.79 0.00 0.22
Std. Dev. 1.66 4.31 0.17 0.35 1.71 3.77 0.22 0.21 1.28 4.60 0.04 0.40
Unit root ADF –3.23 –8.42 –3.09 –5.51 –2.54 –4.79 –2.49 –3.42 –2.35 –7.04 –3.66 –4.64
Unit root PP –3.35 –15.16 –6.64 –10.61 –2.68 –10.15 –5.09 –8.36 –2.26 –11.52 –8.39 –8.14


















Mean 0,65 0,21 0,74 0,65 –0,37 0,18 0,96 0,47 1,10 0,22 0,64 0,73
Maximum 3,58 13,83 4,55 2,60 2,40 9,33 3,93 1,55 3,58 13,83 4,55 2,60
Minimum –5,24 –18,27 8⋅ 10
–18 0,08 –5,24 –16,26 8⋅ 10
–18 0,08 –4,45 –18,27 2⋅ 10
–5 0,09
Std. Dev. 1,66 4,27 0,80 0,41 1,96 4,36 0,91 0,26 1,26 4,25 0,73 0,44
Unit root ADF –3,52 –8,09 –4,79 –4,13 –2,33 –4,60 –3,06 –4,19 –3,54 –6,59 –3,76 –3,63
Unit root PP –3,23 –14,73 –4,50 –9,13 –1,48 –7,71 –2,51 –10,24 –3,47 –12,54 –3,73 –6,69






a –12.2 –0.1 –48.5
a 1.4








This table presents summary descriptive statistics of our dataset. Subsamples were delineated according to regression tests
for structural stability (see below). Mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and correlations are percentage notations.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests reject unit roots (MacKinnon critical values at 1%: –3.44, 5%:
–2.87, 10%: –2.57).




Variables are SP: yield spread (10-year government bond yield minus 3-month USD/DEM interest rate/call rate for Japan),
SR: real stock return (monthly stock market index return minus CPI inflation – index is S&P500 for US, DAX for Germany
and Nikkei-225 for Japan), VOLR interest rate volatility (mean absolute deviation of within-month changes in the short
rate), VOLS: stock market volatility (mean absolute deviation of within-month stock market index returns).
For the US, the sample starts in 1963:7, for Germany in 1965:1 and for Japan in
1966:6. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (mean, maximum and minimum,
standard deviation, unit root tests and correlations) of the suggested explanatory
variables. For each country, the sample was split based on regression tests for
structural stability (see regression results below). In the US, the split coincides
with the change in monetary policy procedures in the early 1980s. For Germany,
the start of the European Monetary System in 1979 is a likely explanation. For
                                                
6 The reason being that values far from the mean are less influential for the mean absolute deviaton
than for the standard deviation (Sachs, 1984, p. 252).10
Japan, financial market deregulation starting in the latter half of the 1970s may
explain the break, see, e.g., Kim and Limpaphayon (1997).
Table 1 reveals that for the US and Japan, the yield spread was negative on
average over the early subperiod but positive over the second subperiod. In
Germany, the spread was positive in both, but about twice as high in the first
subperiod. In the second subsample, the spread is about the same in each of the
three countries, revealing some convergence in international bond rates. Real
stock returns in the US and Germany were about the same magnitude during both
periods; negative over sample I but positive during sample II. In Japan, real stock
returns were slightly higher in the second period, after the financial market
liberalisation. In each of the countries, interest rate volatility has declined over the
second subsample while stock market volatility has increased, both in absolute
levels as in variability. As can be seen, stock returns fluctuate most, while interest
rate spreads and financial volatilities do less so. In all cases, unit root tests suggest
that the data are stationary. Correlations between the explanatory variables are
moderate and generally smaller than 0.50 in absolute values. Only between the
yield spread and interest rate volatility, and real stock returns and stock return
volatility, correlations are higher and mostly negative. This seems to confirm the
leverage effect: the fact that volatility tends to rise when returns are diminishing
or negative (Christie 1981). Remarkably, across the G-3, there is no clear
correlation pattern between stock market and interest rate volatility: in the US,
these series appear positively correlated (high in the first sample), in Germany
there is no correlation overall (though very negative over sample I and positive
over sample II), while in Japan, the series are slightly negatively correlated (due
to sample II).
7 As such, the three countries’ data provide a diverse enough
information set to test the hypothesis that financial volatility adds to explaining
and forecasting recessions. Besides, these countries constitute the G-3, accounting
for 60% of OECD countries’ GDP in 1999 (source: OECD Economic Outlook
1999) and therefore warrant special attention.
3 Empirical evidence
We provide measures of fit and significance for financial variables predicting
recessions k months ahead, first, using a probit model. In the next subsection, we
also investigate the issue using industrial production as a dependent variable using
regression analysis.
3.1 Probit results
As stated above (see footnote 1), Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998) and many
others have documented that yield spreads and changes in share prices have a
noticable forecasting ability for recessions. In a probit context, negative signs are
expected for the yield curve and changes in the real share price index, since
increases in these variables reduce the probability of future recessions. For
                                                
7 Note that there is never a problem of multicollinearity. When we perform the Belsley test (not
reported), the condition numbers are always below 10, still far below the critical value of 20.11
financial volatility, positive signs are expected, because higher financial volatility
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This table reports probit equations for recessions k months ahead,
k = 3, 6, 9, 12. Coefficients and t-stats between brackets for constant
(c0), SP: yield spread (c1), SR: real stock return (c2), VOLR: interest
rate volatility (c3) and VOLS: stock return volatility (c4).
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covariance matrix of the coefficients.
     R
2 is the Estrella (1998) measure of fit for probit, R
2 =
1–(LLu/LLc)
–2LLc/T where LLc and LLu denote the loglikelihood of a
model with only a constant, and with all variables, respectively. T is
the number of observations. Between square brackets, the probability
of the corresponding F-stat is reported, obtained analagously as to
the linear regression relation, F[K–1, T–K] = (T–K)R
2/[(K–1)(1–R
2)]
where K is the number of coefficients to be estimated.




The monthly probit results are reported in Table 2. Signs for the yield spread and
real stock return are as expected for all three countries. In line with previous
evidence for the US, stock returns are useful to predict recessions in the near
future, while the spread remains significant beyond one year of data. In Japan, on
the other hand, the real stock return is a significant recession indicator 9 and 12
months ahead while the yield spread gradually loses its information content. In
Germany, both the spread and real stock return work well as recession indicators
up to one year. These results are in line with previous studies (see footnote 1).
The extension of adding financial volatility is well supported by the data, for
all three countries, based on the t-statistics.
8 Nevertheless, there appear to be some
differences between the countries regarding horizon, sign and which of the
volatility variables are significant. For Germany and Japan, higher interest rate
volatility significantly increases the probability of entering a recession,
consistently, 3 to 12 months ahead. In the US, it adds significant explanatory
power 9 and 12 months ahead. This could indicate that interest rate volatility takes
more time to negatively impact the US economy than it does in Germany and
Japan. This may be explained by the difference of financial systems in Germany
and Japan vis-à-vis the US: companies in the former rely more heavily on bank
finance whereas stock market finance is more common among US firms. Hence, it
may take more time before interest rate changes affect the stock market and
corporate investments in the US than it does in Germany and Japan. Accordingly,
higher stock return volatility, in the US, significantly increases the probability of
recession for the 3-month ahead horizon, suggesting a high short-term exposure of
the economy to stock market volatility. This finding is also consistent with Choe
et al. (1993) and Campbell et al. (2001).
9 Note that there is a sign reversal on
stock volatility, after 6 months; statistics remain insignificant though. In Japan,
higher stock market volatility increases the probability of recession over all
horizons up to 1 year. For Germany, it works in an opposite way, suggesting that
higher stock volatility reduces the probability of recession. See section 3.2 for a
tentative explanation.
Overall, the explanatory power of our financial variables probit equation is
satisfactory, as captured by the R
2 and the F-test significance (see Estrella, 1998).
It reaches a maximum of 0.31 for the US and 0.40 for Germany at a 9-month
horizon, but only 0.16 for Japan at a 3-month horizon. Compare with Boulier and
Stekler (2000) who find an R
2 of 0.26 (US, monthly 1953:4–1998:1, probit with
yield spread) and Estrella-Mishkin (1997) who obtain an R
2 of 0.35 (US, monthly
1973–1994, probit with yield spread) and 0.57 (Germany, monthly 1973–1994,
probit with yield spread).
To assess how well the probit forecasts predict actual recessions, one can use
the quadratic probability score (QPS) as in Diebold and Lopez (1989) and Boulier
and Stekler (2000): QPS =  ) R P ( 2 t t t T
1 − Σ , where Rt is the recession variable
(0–1), and Pt is the model-probability of recession. The QPS ranges between 0 and
                                                
8 t-statistics are based on numerically calculated standard errors that take into account
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The are calculated from var(b) = H
–1gg’H
–1 where g and
H are the gradient and Hessian of the log likelihood evaluated at the maximum likelihood
estimates, var(.) denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients.
9 Campbell et al. (2001), however, do not perform probit estimation; instead they present






k Model QPS 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
8,
3 FMVOL 0.1531 0.0563 0.1956 0.2182 0.1101
FMBASE 0.1590 0.0918 0.1971 0.2156 0.1112
ZEROPROB 0.2550 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
NAIVE 0.2225 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
6 FMVOL 0.1435 0.0579 0.1556 0.2183 0.1112
FMBASE 0.1438 0.0644 0.1517 0.2198 0.1107
ZEROPROB 0.2568 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
NAIVE 0.2238 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
9 FMVOL 0.1412 0.0342 0.1955 0.1819 0.1108
FMBASE 0.1449 0.0387 0.1930 0.1967 0.1097
ZEROPROB 0.2585 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
NAIVE 0.2251 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
12 FMVOL 0.1662 0.0319 0.2610 0.2119 0.1055
FMBASE 0.1705 0.0359 0.2638 0.2248 0.1036
ZEROPROB 0.2603 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
NAIVE 0.2264 0.0000 0.4500 0.3667 0.1212
0.<
3 FMVOL 0.3590 0.4975 0.2776 0.3966 0.3389
FMBASE 0.3891 0.4844 0.3459 0.3761 0.3991
ZEROPROB 0.8531 0.9474 0.6667 1.0333 0.8182
NAIVE 0.4892 0.8133 0.5760 0.8861 0.7041
6 FMVOL 0.3135 0.5016 0.2421 0.3304 0.2859
FMBASE 0.3508 0.4778 0.3027 0.3226 0.3681
ZEROPROB 0.8545 0.9630 0.6667 1.0333 0.8182
NAIVE 0.4894 0.8242 0.5745 0.8839 0.7022
9 FMVOL 0.3040 0.5188 0.2470 0.3102 0.2672
FMBASE 0.3410 0.4663 0.3176 0.3250 0.3285
ZEROPROB 0.8463 0.9020 0.6667 1.0333 0.8182
NAIVE 0.4884 0.7490 0.5517 0.8414 0.6727
12 FMVOL 0.3109 0.5438 0.2737 0.3210 0.2508
FMBASE 0.3495 0.4757 0.3429 0.3390 0.3191
ZEROPROB 0.8381 0.8333 0.6667 1.0333 0.8182
NAIVE 0.4874 0.6799 0.5203 0.8028 0.6408
=
3 FMVOL 0.3983 0.2570 0.3839 0.4127 0.4410
FMBASE 0.4167 0.3950 0.3601 0.4245 0.4675
ZEROPROB 0.7476 0.0000 0.7000 0.8833 0.8939
NAIVE 0.4681 0.1561 0.4649 0.5463 0.5505
6 FMVOL 0.4013 0.2471 0.4204 0.4074 0.4217
FMBASE 0.4180 0.3713 0.3940 0.4150 0.4557
ZEROPROB 0.7531 0.0000 0.7000 0.8833 0.8939
NAIVE 0.46.95 0.1465 0.4678 0.5528 0.5578
9 FMVOL 0.4178 0.2412 0.4494 0.4197 0.4330
FMBASE 0.4310 0.3581 0.4303 0.4297 0.4516
ZEROPROB 0.7586 0.0000 0.7000 0.8833 0.8939
NAIVE 0.4709 0.1386 0.4696 0.5589 0.5621
12 FMVOL 0.4257 0.2142 0.4545 0.4421 0.4344
FMBASE 0.4455 0.3376 0.4418 0.4706 0.4513
ZEROPROB 0.7643 0.0000 0.7000 0.8833 0.8939
NAIVE 0.4722 0.1327 0.4741 0.5622 0.5696
 	,
The QPS appreciates the performance of the recursive forecasts from this probit model (FMVOL)
vis-à-vis other models. FMBASE refers to the Estrella-Mishkin (1998) recursive forecasts from a
probit model with yield spread and stock returns only, ZEROPROB is a model that assumes no
recessions, NAIVE takes as recession probability the recursively updated sample average of
recessions.
QPS =  ) R P ( 2 T
1
t t t − Σ  where Rt is the recession variable (0–1), and Pt is the model-probability
of recession. Lower QPS means better accuracy, QPS ranges between 0 and 2, see Diebold and
Lopez (1989).14
2 and a lower QPS implies a better accuracy. Table 3 compares the QPS for our
financial market volatility-augmented recursive probit forecasts, FMVOL, with
three other benchmark models. The first benchmark, FMBASE, is the Estrella-
Mishkin (1998) recursive probit model with yield spread and stock returns. The
second benchmark, ZEROPROB, assumes that the probability of a recession is zero
in any period. The third benchmark, NAIVE, gives a recession probability equal to
the average proportion of months that were recessionary from the starting date up
to k months in advance of the forecast date. From Table 3, it is clear that overall,
for each horizon, and for most decades, our extended FMVOL model is relatively
more accurate than the other three benchmarks (except for 1960s in US and Japan,
ZEROPROB is perfectly accurate because no recessions were actually registered).
In addition, there is a trade-off between making false recession forecasts and
failing to forecast recessions. Generally, if the probit model yields a probability of
recession exceeding a certain treshold, then the model is assumed to signal
recession (and vice versa for expansion). If this matches reality, a correct signal is
given, otherwhise a false signal has been given. Table 4 reports classification
statistics for the probit model estimated in Table 1, both for a low 0.25 and a high
0.50 treshold.
10 When the low treshold is used, an impressive 88–90% of the
months are correctly classified 3 to 12 months ahead for the US, including
between 32 and 39 out of 57 recession months (56–68%) and between 353 and
359 out of 381–390 non-recession months (91–93%). This compares favourably
to Boulier and Stekler (2000) who find 79% correct classifications (61% for
recession months and 82% for non-recession months). The number of false signals
is relatively large yet smaller than Boulier and Stekler’s: 26–31 out of 60–69
versus 70 out of 111. Furthermore, with a treshold of 0.50, the correct
classification percentage does not change, but this hides a decrease in the false
recession rate and an increase in the missed recession rate (i.e., the false
expansion rate). Still, the number of correct recession signals remains larger than
the number of false alarms, contrary to Boulier and Stekler’s analysis with just the
yield spread included (18–26 vs. 8–12).
For Germany and Japan, the classification statistics are a bit weaker. The total
correct classification percentage is about 66% and 55%, respectively, for a 0.25
treshold, and about 75% and 68%, for a 0.50 treshold. The number of false alarms
versus correct recession signals is more balanced for the 0.25 treshold, but looks
much more favourably in case of the 0.50 treshold.
                                                
10 If estimated probabilities sharply distinguish between recession and non-recession months, then
a high treshold would correctly classify the two types of periods.  If predicted probabilities are
positively correlated with the occurrence of recession but do not sharply distinguish between the
two types, then months will be misclassified. If a low treshold is selected, probit will tend to
correctly identify recesion months but will classify non-recession month as recessions (Boulier and






Good R Good E False R False E Good R Good E False R False E
k R=1 R=0 R=0 R=1 R=1 R=0 R=0 R=1
R*=1 R*=0 R*=1 R*=0 R*=1 R*=0 R*=1 R*=0
25% probability treshold 50% probability treshold
8,
3 38 359 31 19 20 381 9 37
(8.5%) (80.3%) (6.9%) (4.3%) (4.5%) (85.2%) (2.0%) (8.3%)
6 38 359 28 19 23 379 8 34
(8.6%) (80.9%) (6.3%) (4.3%) (5.2%) (85.4%) (1.8%) (7.7%)
9 39 358 26 18 26 376 8 31
(8.8%) (81.2%) (5.9%) (4.1%) (5.9%) (85.3%) (1.8%) (7.0%)
12 32 353 28 25 18 369 12 39
(7.3%) (80.6%) (6.4%) (5.7%) (4.1%) (84.2%) (2.7%) (8.9%)
0.<
3 162 105 141 21 106 212 34 77
(37.8%) (24.5%) (32.9%) (4.9%) (24.7%) (49.4%) (7.9%) (17.9%)
6 158 131 113 24 118 211 33 64
(37.1%) (30.8%) (26.5%) (5.6%) (27.7%) (49.5%) (7.7%) (15.0%)
9 153 141 103 26 119 210 34 60
(36.2%) (33.3%) (24.3%) (6.1%) (28.1%) (49.6%) (8.0%) (14.2%)
12 150 130 114 26 115 213 31 61
(35.7%) (31.0%) (27.1%) (6.2%) (27.4%) (50.7%) (7.4%) (14.5%)
=
3 131 115 143 23 57 230 28 97
(31.8%) (27.9%) (34.7%) (5.6%) (13.8%) (55.8%) (6.8%) (23.5%)
6 132 110 145 22 54 227 28 100
(32.3%) (26.9%) (35.5%) (5.4%) (13.2%) (55.5%) (6.8%) (24.4%)
9 138 79 173 16 48 222 30 106
(34.0%) (19.5%) (42.6%) (3.9%) (11.8%) (54.7%) (7.4%) (26.1%)
12 140 47 202 14 51 220 29 103
(34.7%) (11.7%) (50.1%) (3.5%) (12.7%) (54.6%) (7.2%) (25.6%)
 	,
Recessions and expansions can be signaled correctly or incorrectly. If the probit model yields a
probability of recession (not) exceeding a –25% or 50%–treshold, then the model is assumed to
signal a recession, R*=1 (expansion, R*=0). If this matches reality, a correct recession
(expansion) signal is given, and if not, a false recession (expansion) signal has been given, R*=1
and R=0 (R*=0 and R=1).
This table reports classification statistics for the probit model estimated in table 1. Both the
number of months and the sample percentages (between brackets) are reported.
3.2 Regression results
In this section, we investigate whether financial volatility adds significantly to the
yield spread and real stock return to explain changes in industrial production
(source: IFS line 66c), using monthly data. Table 5 reports regression results of
12-month changes in industrial production with ordinary least squares (t-stats are
Newey-West corrected t-statistics). As indicated in section 2, there appeared to be
structural instability in this regression. Checking for this using a CUSUM test
resulted in a sample split at 1981:12 for the US, 1979:12 for Germany and
1976:12 for Japan (see also section 2). Clearly, coefficient estimates are very





Period c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 R
2
8,




a (–0.54) (–1.24) [0.000]











































1977:1–2000:12 0.034 0.012 0.112 0.002 –3.271 0.210
(3.09)
a (3.18)
a (1.28) (0.30) (–2.85)
a [0.000]
 	,
The table reports OLS results of 12-month industrial production growth using the same
explanatory variables as in the probit model. t-stats are Newey-West corrected for





The samples were split since there was structural instability, as suggested by CUSUM
tests.
For the US, the full sample results do not show any significant influence of
volatilities in explaining industrial production growth, in addition to the yield
spread and real stock returns (both of which are statistically significant with a
correct sign). The two subsamples however do show a significant effect of market
volatility, though the signs are ambiguous: in sample I, higher interest rate
volatility seems to boost future growth while it tends to (marginally) reduce
growth in sample II; higher stock market volatility is first significantly reducing,
then significantly stimulating future growth. As for the sign reversal on interest
rates, it might be tempting to relate this to Federal Reserve monetary policy, and
interest rate policy in particular. Uncertainty about the monetary transmission
mechanism may have been higher in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., due to the
Vietnam war, oil shocks, etc.), entailing a low signal-to-noise ratio, thereby
raising induced interest rate volatility. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Federal
Reserve may have become more succesful in steering market interest rate
expectations (after the lifting of Regulation Q) and making the policy
transmission channel much more straightforward, thereby reducing interest17
volatility and improving the signal-to-noise ratio.
11 The sign on stock volatility
during sample I is in line with our hypothesis and consistent with the 3-month
probit results.
12 In order to explain the positive sign on stock return volatility over
the late sample, one needs to inspect the German results first.
In Germany, there is evidence of a marginally significant and negative effect
of interest rate volatility on future growth, overall, and in the first subsample,
consistent with our hypothesis and in line with the probit results.
13 Stock market
volatility plays a significant role in the 1980s-90s, but again, as in the US, the sign
is positive. Since this is also the case in the US for the 1980s–1990s, one may be
willing to accept that there is a common source for these results. Given the time
frame, one can think of the liberalisation of financial markets, and stock markets
in particular, as a common explanation: capital flows and foreign direct
investments have increased dramatically in and between the US and Europe since
late 1970s, and this has lead to an increase in economic growth. It may also have
lead to increased stock volatility (see Table 1). Theoretically, in the 1960s and
1970s, the US and German economy were subject to binding constraints with
respect to capital flows, and the lifting of these constraints may have increased
real growth and foreign direct investments, while at the same time also raising
stock volatility.
14 Related, this may point to the fact that higher stock volatility
during the 1980s and 1990s may be an indication of greater informational
efficiency (or a higher signal-to-noise ratio), see Froot and Perold (1995). Note
also that these regression results are consistent with the probit results of stock
volatility in Table 2, for Germany (all horizons) and the US (12-month horizon;
negative though not significant).
The Japanese results are consistent with the probit results of Table 1.
Similarly, an increase in interest rate or stock market volatility significantly
reduces growth of industrial production over the next year, both over the full
sample as for the two subperiods (except for interest rate volatility, which is not
significant over sample II). In addition to the pure financial volatility hypothesis,
this may also be related to the special character of the boom-bust cycle of
Japanese asset markets and the resulting negative wealth effects transmitted to the
banking and business sector (see also Suzuki, 1997).
                                                
11 In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s, interest rates were bound by Regulation Q, and monetary
policy was conducted using monetary targets (formally starting in 1972). In the 1980s and 1990s,
interest rates have become more responsive to market conditions, and monetary policy has been
based on interest rate targeting. Accordingly, investors have received much clearer signals as to
properly evaluate the costs of borrowed funds and to discount risk premia and interest rate
uncertainty into future cashflows than they had before, when interest rates had an upper bound.
Therefore, interest rate volatility may have become part of US investors’ information set in the
way outlined in the introduction, and hence the sign reversal is consistent with the probit results.
12 Our results are also in line with Campbell et al. (2001), over a 3-month forecasting horizon,
1963–1997. However, there also appeared to be structural instability in this forecasting equation.
13 For Germany, there is no need to account for sign reversals on interest rate volatility. Contrary
to the US, there has not been a major shift in monetary policy or interest rate policy. Germany has
retained a largely independent central bank, also under the EMS, where it played a role as safe
heaven and anchor currency. In fact, other European countries participating in the EMS have been
forced to follow Bundesbank policy. The current ECB is also seen by many observers as a replica
of the Bundesbank.
14 Japan remains more of a closed economy with respect to foreign direct investment. Therefore,
the story may not apply to Japan.18
4 Conclusion
We confirmed and extended the findings of Estrella and Mishkin (1997, 1998)
and Boulier and Stekler (2000) that financial variables are useful to predict
recessions. In addition to the yield spread and stock returns, measures of financial
market volatility were argued to signal recessions. The hypothesis was examined
empirically using monthly data for the US, Germany, and Japan, with a prediction
horizon of 3 to 12 months. Overall, we find that the estimation of recession
probabilities is improved when financial volatility is taken into account, in
addition to the yield spread and stock returns. More specifically, higher interest
rate volatility proves to significantly increase the probability of a future recession,
for all three countries, and, for Japan, stock market volatility has the same effect.
For Japan, wealth effects associated with drastic domestic stock price movements
support this finding. For Germany and the US, we argue that stock volatility has
had another effect, because of financial market liberalisation and,
correspondingly, increased capital flows that serve to increase growth, improve
the informational market efficiency and raise financial volatility at the same time.19
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